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Position-based quantum cryptography (PBQC) allows a party to use its geographical location
as its only credential to implement various cryptographic protocols. Such a protocol may lead to
important applications in practice. Although it has been shown that any PBQC protocol is breakable
if the adversaries pre-share an arbitrarily large entangled state, the security of PBQC in the bounded-
quantum-storage model is still an open question. In this paper, we study the performance of various
PBQC protocols over a lossy channel under the assumption that no entanglement is pre-shared
between adversaries. By introducing the decoy state idea, we show that an extended BB84-type
PBQC protocol implemented with a weak coherent source and realistic single photon detectors can
tolerate an overall loss (including both the channel loss and the detection efficiency) of 13 dB if the
intrinsic quantum bit error rate is 1%. We also study a few continuous variable PBQC protocols
and show that they suffer from a 3 dB loss limitation.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum physics has been applied to enhance com-
munication security. A well-known example is quantum
key distribution (QKD) [1–5], which has been proved to
be unconditionally secure in principle [6–8]. More re-
cently, position-based quantum cryptography (PBQC)
has drawn a lot of attention [9–15].
In PBQC, a legitimate party uses its geographical lo-
cation as its only credential to implement various cryp-
tographic protocols. One fundamental task in PBQC is
secure position verification, in which an honest prover
tries to prove to a set of trusted verifiers that he/she is
at a certain location. It has been shown that, given a
secure position verification scheme, other position-based
cryptographic tasks, such as authentication and key dis-
tribution, can also be implemented [14].
Although previous studies have shown that any PBQC
protocols are breakable if the adversaries pre-share an ar-
bitrarily large entangled state [14], the security of PBQC
in the bounded-quantum-storage model, which is more
relevant in practice, is still an open question. In [14],
the security of PBQC has been proved based on the as-
sumption that no entanglement is pre-shared between
adversaries. In [15], the authors proposed a one-round
quantum position verification scheme and proved its se-
curity against adversaries with an amount of pre-shared
entanglement that is linear in the number of qubits trans-
mitted. In contrast, all classical position-based crypto-
graphic protocols are breakable without using pre-shared
entanglement [16]. This highlights the advantage of
PBQC over its classical counterpart.
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One important issue in PBQC which has not been care-
fully addressed is its tolerance to the loss of the quantum
communication channel. In most of the previous studies,
the BB84 encoding scheme has been adopted to imple-
ment a PBQC protocol. It is easy to show (see Section II)
that the above protocol is insecure as long as the overall
loss is above 3 dB. In practice, the loss of the measure-
ment device itself (including optical coupling loss and de-
tector efficiency) is typically above 3 dB. This suggests
the BB84-type PBQC protocols are impractical.
In this paper, we explore PBQC protocols which can
go beyond the above 3 dB limit. We study the perfor-
mance of various PBQC protocols over a lossy channel
under the assumption that no entanglement is pre-shared
between adversaries. These PBQC protocls are derived
naturally from the corresponding QKD schemes, includ-
ing both discrete-variable (DV) and continuous-variable
(CV) schemes. Our study shows that a DV PBQC pro-
tocol, which was proposed in [10, 13], can tolerate an
arbitrarily high loss in the noiseless case. By introducing
the decoy state idea [17], the above protocol can toler-
ate an overall loss of 13 dB at a quantum bit error rate
(QBER) of 1%, even when implemented with a practical
weak coherent source and realistic single photon detec-
tors (SPDs). In contrast, all the CV PBQC protocols
studied in this paper suffer from a 3 dB loss limitation,
even by using arbitrarily squeezed states and noiseless
detectors.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we
outline the basic procedures of a PBQC protocol and the
main assumptions we adopt. In Section III, we study
the performance of a DV PBQC protocol in both ideal
and realistic scenarios. In Section IV, we present our
results of CV PBQC protocols. We conclude with a brief
discussion in Section V.
2II. POSITION-BASED QUANTUM
CRYPTOGRAPHY
For simplicity, in this paper, we only consider the one-
dimensional case with two verifiers, V0 and V1, and a
prover P in the middle. The verifiers wish to verify the
position of P . Unfortunately, there are two adversaries,
E0 (between V0 and P ) and E1 (between V1 and P ) who
will try to fake P .
We assume that V0 and V1 hold synchronized clocks
and they also share a secure communication channel
(which could be established by using QKD). E0 and E1
have full control of the communication channels (both
quantum and classical) between V0 and P , as well as the
one between V1 and P . Furthermore, they have perfect
detectors (noiseless and lossless) and can perform any lo-
cal operations allowed by quantum mechanics with arbi-
trarily high precision. However, E0 and E1 do not share
any entanglement. Note that in the above picture, the
adversaries can completely hijack signals from P . So, we
can simply ignore the existence of P in our discussion
below.
Most existing PBQC protocols are based on the BB84-
type coding scheme. The basic procedure is summarized
below:
1. The verifiers agree on random bits x, θ ∈ {0, 1}. V0
prepares a qubit in the state
|ψ〉 = Hθ|x〉 (1)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are computational basis states,
and H is the Hadamard matrix.
2. V0 sends |ψ〉 to P through a free-space quantum
channel, and V1 sends θ to P through a free-space
classical channel. V0 and V1 coordinate their trans-
mission time to make sure that |ψ〉 and θ arrive at
P at the same time.
3. As soon as |ψ〉 and θ arrive, P performs a measure-
ment in the basis {Hθ|0〉, Hθ|1〉} and broadcasts
the measurement result x′ back to V0 and V1 im-
mediately.
4. If the verifiers receive x′ at the time consistent with
the position of P , and x′ agrees with x, the location
of P is accepted as authenticated.
Intuitively, the security of the above protocol can be un-
derstood from the quantum no-cloning theorem [18]: af-
ter step 2, E0 can intercept |ψ〉 and E1 can intercept
θ before P receives them. However, without the other
piece of information, neither of them can perform step 3.
While E1 can keep one copy of the classical information
θ and forward another copy to E0, E0 cannot make per-
fect copies of the quantum state |ψ〉. If E0 keeps |ψ〉 in
a quantum memory and performs the measurement after
she receives θ from E1, it will be too late to report the
measurement result back to V1. On the other hand, if
E0 forwards |ψ〉 to E1, who in turn performs the mea-
surement, it will be too late to report the measurement
result back to V0. We remark that the above argument
is fallacious if E0 and E1 pre-share entanglement, which
allows them to perform quantum teleportation [19]. In
this paper, we will only consider the case of no pre-shared
entanglement between adversaries.
One major issue in practice is the low reporting rate
expected from honest P . Due to the channel loss and
the low efficiency of practical SPDs, most of the time,
P will report a “no detection” event. The adversaries
can take advantage of the low detection probability and
fool the verifiers. More specifically, once E0 receives |ψ〉,
she randomly chooses one of the two bases and performs
a measurement. Then she forwards a copy of her basis
information and the measurement result to E1. On the
other hand, once E1 receives θ, she forwards a copy to
E0. If E0 happens to use the correct basis, E0 and E1
report the measurement result to V0 and V1, respectively.
Otherwise, they claim no detection. Since there are only
two possible bases in the above protocol, the adversaries
can achieve a 50% reporting rate without introducing
errors. This suggests that the above protocol is insecure
as long as the overall loss is above 3 dB 1. Considering the
high coupling loss of a free-space communication channel
and the low detection efficiency of a practical SPD, the
above PBQC protocol may only work over a very short
distance. To make PBQC useful in practice, we need
protocols which can go beyond this 3 dB limit. In the rest
of this paper, we study the performance of various PBQC
protocols over a lossy channel under the assumption that
no entanglement is pre-shared between adversaries.
III. DISCRETE-VARIABLE PBQC PROTOCOL
One approach to the development of a loss-tolerant
PBQC protocol is to employ more than two encoding
bases. Here we study the performance of a PBQC pro-
tocol based on a natural extension of the BB84 coding
scheme, where V0 employs K encoding bases uniformly
distributed over the whole Bloch sphere. Compared to
the original PBQC scheme, this protocol also has an en-
hanced security [13].
We first describe the procedure of the PBQC proto-
col. For simplicity, we assume that K is large enough
that the encoding bases can be treated as uniformly and
continuously distributed over the Bloch sphere.
1. The verifiers agree on a random bit x ∈ {0, 1} and
1 The verifiers cannot distinguish between the channel loss and
the detection loss in a PBQC protocol. So we use only one pa-
rameter, the overall loss, to quantify the transmittance. In this
paper, we also neglect imperfection in V0’s source, which cannot
be accessed by the adversaries, and can be well calibrated by the
verifiers.
3two continuous random numbers θ ∈ [0, pi], φ ∈
[0, 2pi).
V0 prepares a qubit in the state
|ψ〉 = U(θ, φ)|x〉 (2)
where U(θ, φ) =
(
cos θ2 e
iφ sin θ2
−e−iφ sin θ2 cos θ2
)
2. V0 sends |ψ〉 to P , and V1 sends θ and φ to P . V0
and V1 coordinate their transmission times to make
sure that |ψ〉, θ and φ arrive at P at the same time.
3. As soon as |ψ〉, θ and φ arrive, P performs a mea-
surement in the basis {U(θ, φ)|0〉, U(θ, φ)|1〉}. If
P detects a photon successfully, he broadcasts the
measurement result x′ back to V0 and V1 immedi-
ately. Otherwise, he reports no detection.
4. If the verifiers receive x′ at a time inconsistent with
the position of P , the protocol fails and will be
terminated.
5. Through an authenticated classical channel, V0 and
V1 compare the reported measurement results re-
ceived by them. If they receive different results,
the protocol fails and will be terminated.
6. V0, V1 and P repeat the above procedures many
times. They estimate the reporting rate and the
QBER. For a given reporting rate, if the QBER is
below certain predetermined value, the location of
P is accepted as authenticated.
As noted in [13], noisy operation in the honest case do
not produce inconsistent results between different veri-
fiers. This is because the classical communication chan-
nel used by P to broadcast the measurement results is
virtually noiseless. By performing step 5, we can further
limit the adversaries’ power. For example, one possible
hacking strategy is as follows. As soon as E1 receives θ
and φ, she forwards a copy to E0. As soon as E0 receives
|ψ〉, she applies an optimal cloning machine to generate
two imperfect copies of the input quantum state, keeps
one and sends the other one to E1. Once E0 receives the
basis information from E1, she measures her copy and
reports the measurement result to V0. Similarly, E1 mea-
sures her own copy and reports the measurement result
to V1. In general, such an attack will produce inconsis-
tent results between V0 and V1 and thus can be detected
in step 5. The same argument can also be applied in CV
PBQC protocols based on coherent detection.
Below, we will study the performance of the above pro-
tocol implemented with either a perfect single photon
source or a more practical weak coherent source.
A. Single photon source
We assume that V0 employs a perfect single photon
source to implement the above PBQC protocol. If the
PBQC system is noiseless, the verifiers expect a perfect
correlation between the measurement result reported by
the honest P and the information encoded by V0. How-
ever, if the overall transmittance of the quantum commu-
nication system between V0 and P is η, then the verifiers
expect a reporting rate of η.
Having no information about the basis, E0 will make
a choice of basis (θE , φE) for her measurement. To make
the attack undetectable, E0 can randomly choose one of
the above K bases. E0 will then measure the quantum
state sent by V0, and forward a copy of her basis informa-
tion and the measurement result to E1. If E0 happens to
use the correct basis, E0 and E1 will report the measure-
ment result to V0 and V1 correspondingly. Otherwise,
they claim no detection. Obviously, the reporting rate R
is given by 2/K (the adversaries report the result of the
measurement, if θ = φ = 0, and the opposite result, if
θ = pi, φ = 0). If R < η, Eve’s attack can be detected
due to the abnormal reporting rate. As K → ∞, the
adversaries’ reporting rate R → 0, which suggests that
the above protocol can tolerate arbitrarily high channel
loss in the noiseless case.
In practice, the quantum communication system be-
tween V0 and P is noisy due to imperfect state prepara-
tion, detector noise, etc. In this case, the expected QBER
from the honest P will not be zero. The adversaries can
take advantage of the non-zero QBER to further improve
their attack. As long as the adversaries can produce the
same reporting rate and the QBER expected from the
honest P at a time consistent with the position of P , the
security of the PBQC protocol is compromised.
The hacking strategy is discussed in detail in the Ap-
pendix in the case of a finite K. Here, we proceed with
a description of the strategy in the large K limit.
As soon as E0 receives the quantum state |ψ〉, she
measures it in a basis randomly chosen from the whole
Bloch sphere2 and forwards a copy of her basis infor-
mation (θE , φE) and the measurement result (x
′) to E1.
Since the K bases chosen by the verifiers are uniformly
distributed, for simplicity, in our calculations we set
θE = φE = 0, without loss of generality. The error
probability of E0’s measurement result is given by sin
2 θ
2 ,
which is independent of φ. The adversaries’ strategy is
as follows: if θ ∈ [0,Θ0) (where Θ0 < pi/2 is a constant
predetermined by the adversaries), they will report x′ to
V0 (V1); if θ ∈ (pi − Θ0, pi], they will flip the bit and re-
port x′ + 1 (mod 2) to V0 (V1); otherwise, they claim no
detection.
It is easy to show that the adversaries’ reporting rate
is given by
R1 =
∫ Θ0
0
sin θdθ = 2 sin2
Θ0
2
(3)
2 If E0 always chooses the same basis, the reporting probability
will depend on V0’s basis. This can be detected by the verifiers.
4and the average QBER introduced by the above attack
is given by
Q1 =
1
R1
∫ Θ0
0
sin2
θ
2
sin θdθ =
R1
4
(4)
In the above equations, the subscript 1 indicates that a
single photon source is applied.
Eq. (4) quantifies the relation between the maximum
reporting rate R1 and the corresponding QBER Q1 due
to the attack. It also shows how much loss the PBQC
protocol can tolerate given an intrinsic QBER. For ex-
ample, if the intrinsic QBER of the legitimate quantum
communication system is 1%, then the adversaries could
reproduce the same QBER with a reporting rate of up
to 4%. This reporting rate is consistent with the one ex-
pected from a quantum channel with an overall loss of 14
dB. This implies that given a 1% intrinsic QBER, this
protocol is secure as long as the overall loss is below 14
dB. In general, the lower the intrinsic QBER, the higher
the tolerable loss.
In the Appendix, we study the case of a finite number
K of uniformly distributed bases and obtain the maxi-
mum reporting rate for a given QBER. As we show there,
the above results are recovered in the large K limit. The
convergence is actually fast, indicating that for practical
applications K need not be very large.
B. Weak coherent source
A high quality, efficient single photon source is not
available in practice. In this subsection, we will study the
performance of the above PBQC protocol implemented
with a practical attenuated laser source. We assume that
the global phase of each laser pulse has been random-
ized properly, so we can model the source as a phase-
randomized weak coherent state.
The performance of the BB84 QKD protocol degrades
significantly when implemented with a phase-randomized
weak coherent state. This is mainly due to the photon
number splitting (PNS) attack [20]: if the quantum sig-
nal contains more than one photons, an eavesdropper can
split out one photon, store it in a quantum memory, and
perform a measurement when the basis information is
available. One way to solve the above problem is to in-
troduce the decoy state idea [17]. As we will show below,
the decoy state idea can also be applied in PBQC proto-
cols.
The photon number of a coherent state follows a Pois-
son distribution:
Pn =
µn1
n!
e−µ1 (5)
where µ1 is the average photon number of the coherent
state, which is determined by V0.
We assume that the quantum communication system
between V0 and P is characterized by the following pa-
rameters: η – the overall transmittance; Y0 – the dark-
count probability of SPD; and edet – the error probability
due to misalignment.
In normal conditions (no adversaries), the expected re-
porting rate and QBER from the honest P are given,
respectively, by [21]
R
(µ1)
P = Y0 + 1− e−ηµ1
Q
(µ1)
P =
1
2
Y0 + edet(1− e−ηµ1)
R
(µ1)
P
(6)
where we have assumed that the error rate of the dark
count is 0.5.
The adversaries’ hacking strategy is as follows. As soon
as E0 receives the quantum state from V0, she performs a
quantum non-demolition measurement to determine the
photon number n in V0’s signal. Then there are three
possibilities:
(a) If n = 0, E0 and E1 report no detection.
(b) If n = 1, E0 and E1 perform the same attack as
described in the previous subsection.
(c) If n > 1, E0 can optimize her measurement strategy
to gain maximum information about x. 3
We define Rn and Qn as the conditional reporting rate
and QBER, respectively, given that V0’s signal contains
n photons. In the attack outlined above, R0 = Q0 = 0,
whereas for a given Q1, R1 is upper bounded by Eq. (4).
In the case of n > 1, determining the optimal measure-
ment strategy for E0 is a problem related to the prob-
lem of optimal state estimation with post-measurement
information [22]. The latter is by itself an interesting re-
search topic. Here we will simply assume that Rn = 1
and Qn = 0 for n > 1, which is the most favorable as-
sumption for the adversaries, although a corresponding
strategy may not exist. The overall reporting rate and
QBER under the above assumptions are given by, respec-
tively,
R(µ1) =
∞∑
n=0
PnRn = µ1e
−µ1R1 + 1− (1 + µ1)e−µ1
Q(µ1) =
∑∞
n=0 PnRnQn∑∞
n=0 PnRn
=
µ1e
−µ1R1
2
4R(µ1)
(7)
3 In the case of n > 1, one may suggest the following attack: E0
keeps one photon in her quantum memory and forwards the rest
to E1. After receiving the basis information from E1, E0 can
measure her photon in the correct basis and report the mea-
surement result to V0. Similarly, E1 can measure the photons
forwarded by E0 and report the measurement result to V1. In
the ideal case, the adversaries will not introduce errors. However,
in practice, the quantum state prepared by V0 cannot be perfect
(or V0 may intentionally introduce a small amount of noise). So
the above attack will produce inconsistent results received by V0
and V1, and thus can be detected in step 5 of the protocol.
5where we used the relation Q1 = R1/4 (Eq. (4)).
Without using decoy states, R(µ1) and Q(µ1) are the
only parameters available to the verifiers. To make their
attack undetectable, the adversaries need to match R(µ1)
and Q(µ1) with R
(µ1)
P and P
(µ1)
P by adjusting R1. We per-
formed a numerical simulation using Eqs. (6) and (7) with
the following system parameters: Y0 = 10
−5, edet = 0.01,
and µ1 = 0.018 (µ1 has been optimized to maximize the
tolerable overall loss). Our simulation shows that as long
as the overall transmittance η < 0.07 (which corresponds
to 11.5 dB loss), the above PBQC protocol is insecure.
This shows that the performance of the PBQC imple-
mented with a weak coherence source is worse than the
one implemented with a perfect single photon source.
The basic idea of the decoy-state protocol is quite
simple. For each transmission, V0 randomly chooses
a number from a predetermined set {µ1, µ2, . . . , µM},
and sets the average photon number of the weak co-
herent pulse to the corresponding value. At the end
of the protocol, V0 can determine the reporting rate
and QBER for each µi (i = 1, 2...M) separately. Now
the parameters available to the verifiers are in the set
{R(µ1), Q(µ1);R(µ2), Q(µ2); . . . ;R(µM ), Q(µM)}. As M →
∞, the verifiers can determine the reporting rate and
QBER of the single-photon pulse, (R1, Q1), precisely [17].
This is equivalent to the case that V0 has a perfect single
photon source. So, by introducing the decoy-state idea,
in the asymptotic case (i.e.,M →∞, and the finite-date-
size effect can be ignored) the performance of PBQC im-
plemented with a weak coherence source approaches to
the one implemented with a perfect single-photon source.
In practice, it is inefficient to use a large M . Here, we
study the simplest case whereM = 2. Similar to (6), the
expected reporting rate and QBER when V0 chooses µ2
as the average photon number are given, respectively, by
R
(µ2)
P = Y0 + 1− e−ηµ2
Q
(µ2)
P =
1
2
Y0 + edet(1− e−ηµ2)
R
(µ2)
P
(8)
Using (6) and (8), we can determine a lower bound of the
reporting rate of a single-photon pulse [21]:
R
(1)
L =
µ1
µ1µ2 − µ22
(
R
(µ2)
P e
µ2 −R(µ1)P eµ1
µ22
µ21
−2Q(µ1)P R(µ1)P eµ1
µ21 − µ22
µ21
)
(9)
By using R
(1)
L as an estimation of R1 in (7), we can de-
termine a lower bound of the QBER due to the attack:
Q
(µ1)
L =
µ1e
−µ1(R
(1)
L )
2
4R(µ1)
(10)
To make their attack undetectable, the adversaries need
to match R(µ1) and Q
(µ1)
L with R
(µ1)
P and Q
(µ1)
P , respec-
tively. We performed a numerical simulation using Eqs.
(6), (7), (8), (9), and (10) with the following system
parameters: Y0 = 10
−5, edet = 0.01, µ1 = 0.12, and
µ2 = 0.1. Our simulation shows that as long as the over-
all transmittance η > 0.05 (which corresponds to about
13 dB loss), the above PBQC protocol is secure. This re-
sult is comparable with the one based on a perfect single
photon source. Furthermore, compared with the weak
coherent state protocol without decoy states, the decoy
state protocol allows V0 to use a relatively large average
photon number, which is more efficient.
IV. CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE PBQC
PROTOCOLS
Continuous-variable (CV) QKD protocols based on op-
tical coherent detection (such as homodyne or heterodyne
detection) have been demonstrated as useful solutions for
secure key distribution [23–27]. While the SPD used in
DV QKD may output a “no-detection” event, the homo-
dyne (or heterodyne) detector used in CV QKD always
yields a measurement result regardless of channel loss.
This suggests the “post-selection” strategy discussed in
the previous Section, where the adversaries report a mea-
surement result only when they happen to use a “good”
measurement basis, cannot be applied in CV PBQC pro-
tocols based on coherent detection. Another distinct ad-
vantage of the CV protocol is that the local oscillator
(LO) employed in coherent detection acts as a “mode
selector” which can suppress broadband noise photons
effectively [28]. This feature is especially appealing in
free-space quantum communication systems where the
background noise due to ambient light is high.
One of the most successful CV QKD protocols is the
Gaussian-modulated-coherent-state (GMCS) QKD [24].
In this protocol, Alice draws two random numbers, xA
and pA, from a set of Gaussian random numbers, and
sends a coherent state |xA + ipA〉 to Bob. Bob ran-
domly chooses to measure either the amplitude quadra-
ture (qX) or the phase quadrature (qP ) by performing
an optical homodyne detection. Later on, Bob informs
Alice of which quadrature he measured for each trans-
mission, and then they can generate a secure key from
the corresponding data.
The above GMCS QKD protocol can be extended into
a PBQC protocol as follows. V0 prepares and sends the
coherent state |xA+ipA〉 to P , while V1 sends P a random
number θ which is uniformly distributed in [0, pi]. Once
P receives the quantum state from V0, he performs a
homodyne detection along the phase θ, and reports back
the measurement result of the quadrature
qθ = qX cos θ + qP sin θ (11)
If the verifiers receive the measurement results at a time
consistent with the position of P , and the measurement
noise is consistent with the one expected from the channel
with a predetermined loss, the location of P is accepted
as authenticated.
6Unfortunately, it is easy to show that the above PBQC
protocol is insecure as long as the overall loss is above 3
dB. The hacking strategy is as follows. As soon as E0
receives the quantum state from V0, she splits it into
two parts (I and II) using a 50:50 beam splitter. She
then measures the amplitude quadrature of part I and
the phase quadrature of part II, and forwards the mea-
surement results, (qX , qP ), to E1. Once E0 receives the
information of θ forwarded by E1, she calculates qθ (Eq.
(11)), and reports it to V0. E1 performs the same calcu-
lation and reports the result to V1. It is easy to verify
that the noise due to this attack is equivalent to the one
due to a channel with 3 dB loss. So the above attack will
always succeed, as long as the overall loss is above 3 dB.
Can we improve the performance of PBQC by using
squeezed states? Suppose that V0 prepares a squeezed
state with a randomly chosen squeezing angle θ. By using
an infinitely squeezed state, a quadrature measurement
in any angle other than θ will result in an arbitrarily large
uncertainty. If E0 measures both the amplitude quadra-
ture qX and the phase quadrature qP as described above,
most likely, the uncertainties in both measurements are
very high. Intuitively, this will result in a large uncer-
tainty in E0’s estimation of qθ (Eq. (11)). It follows that
the adversaries will not be able to reproduce the small
measurement noise expected from the honest P , and thus
they will be caught by the verifiers. However, as we will
show below, the above intuition is wrong. The perfor-
mance of the above coherent-state PBQC protocol is not
improved by using squeezed states. Roughly speaking,
this is due to the fact that the noises in qX and qP are
correlated and can be canceled out when E0 estimates
qθ.
The squeezed state PBQC protocol is summarized as
follows.
1. The verifiers agree on two random numbers θ and α,
with θ uniformly distributed in [0, pi], and α drawn
from a Gaussian distribution of mean 0 and vari-
ance σ2. V0 prepares the squeezed coherent state
|ψ〉 = R(θ)D(α)S(s)|0〉 (12)
where R(θ) = eiθa
†a represents a rotation, D(α) =
eα(a
†−a) represents a displacement, and S(s) =
e
s
2
(a2−a†2) is the squeezing operator. We assume
that V0 can generate a squeezed state with an ar-
bitrarily large squeezing parameter s. Note that
when s = 0, this protocol reduces to the coherent-
state protocol.
2. V0 sends |ψ〉 to P , and V1 sends θ to P . V0 and V1
coordinate their transmission times to make sure
that |ψ〉 and θ arrive at P at the same time.
3. When P receives |ψ〉 and θ, he first applies R(−θ),
then he performs a homodyne detection to measure
the quadrature qX , and immediately broadcasts the
measurement result α′ to V0 and V1.
4. If the verifiers receive α′ at a time inconsistent with
the position of P , the protocol fails and is termi-
nated.
5. Through an authenticated classical channel, V0 and
V1 compare the reported measurement results re-
ceived by them. If they receive different results,
the protocol fails and is terminated.
6. V0, V1, and P repeat the above steps many times.
They estimate the conditional variance
∆ =
〈(
α− α
′
√
η
)2〉
(13)
where η is the overall transmittance of the quantum
channel.
If ∆ is consistent with the value expected from a
channel with an overall transmittance η, the loca-
tion of P is accepted as authenticated.
In normal conditions (no adversaries), the expected con-
ditional variance from the honest P is given by
∆P =
1
4
e−2s +
1− η
4η
(14)
where the second term on the right-hand side represents
the vacuum noise due to the channel loss (referred to the
input of the channel).
Again, the adversaries launch the attack described
above by using a 50:50 beam splitter and homodyne de-
tectors. Let us define the annihilation operators of the
two input modes of the beam spliter as a and b, and the
annihilation operators of the two output modes as c and
d, respectively. They are related by c =
1√
2
(a− b), and
d =
1√
2
(a+ b).
E0 sends |ψ〉 to mode a, the vacuum state to mode b,
and measures qX of mode c and qP of mode d,
q
(c)
X =
c+ + c
2
=
1
2
√
2
(a+ + a− b+ − b)
q
(d)
P =
i(d+ − d)
2
=
i
2
√
2
(a+ − a+ b+ − b) (15)
After receiving information on θ from V1, the adversaries
report α′ =
√
2η(q
(c)
X cos θ + q
(d)
P sin θ).
Using Eq. (13) and the following relations
R†(θ)aR(θ) = eiθa
D†(α)aD(α) = a+ α ,
S†(s)aS(s) = a cosh s− a† sinh s , (16)
it is straightforward to calculate the conditional variance
due to the attack,
∆E =
1
4
e−2s +
1
4
(17)
7Comparing Eqs. (14) and (17), it is easy to see that as
long as the overall transmittance η < 0.5, we will have
∆E < ∆P , which means the adversaries can reproduce
the noise variance expected from the honest P thus the
PBQC protocol is not secure. It should be noted that
this result is independent of the squeezing parameter s.
V. DISCUSSION
In principle, both the BB84 QKD and the GMCS
QKD can tolerate arbitrarily high channel loss when im-
plemented with perfect devices. This is because Alice
and Bob share an authenticated classical channel, which
allows them to perform either post-selection or reverse
reconciliation. However, in PBQC, the verifers and the
prover do not share an authenticated classical channel, so
they cannot apply the post-selection or reverse reconcil-
iation scheme. This could explain why PBQC protocols
based on the BB84 or GMCS encoding schemes cannot
go beyond the 3 dB loss limit.
A natural way to go beyond the above 3 dB limit is to
use multiple encoding bases. Our discussion showed that
by introducing the decoy state idea, an extended BB84-
type PBQC protocol implemented with a weak coherent
source and realistic SPDs could tolerate a total loss of 13
dB when the intrinsic QBER is 1%. Such a protocol could
find real-life applications. To further extend its working
distance, one could explore new encoding schemes using
a large set of mutually unbiased bases such as the one
employed in [29].
In the case of CV PBQC protocols based on coher-
ent detection, we have been unable to find a good way
to go beyond the 3 dB limit, even by using arbitrarily
squeezed states and perfect homodyne detectors. This
result could be understood from the point of view of a
virtual entanglement model [30]. In the squeezed state
PBQC protocol discussed in Section IV, V0 could prepare
the quantum state |ψ〉 from a two-mode squeezed vacuum
(TMSV) by measuring a randomly chosen quadrature qθ
of mode I using a homodyne detector, and sends mode
II to P . Later on, E0 measures both the X-quadrature
and P -quadrature of mode II by performing a conjugate
homodyne detection. Since measurements performed by
V0 and E0 commute with each other, we can reverse the
order without changing the measurement statistics. In
this picture, E0 measures mode II first while projecting
mode I onto a Gaussian-modulated coherent state. Then
V0 measures its quadrature qθ. As such, the squeezed-
state protocol is equivalent to a coherent state protocol
and suffers from the same limitations. Nevertheless, the
limitation of CV PBQC protocol can be partially com-
pensated by the relatively high efficiency of a practical
homodyne detector.
FIG. 1: (Color online) Reporting rate (R1) vs. QBER
(Q1) for finite number of bases with N = 4 (triangles),
N = 8 (circles), and N →∞ (solid line).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Ryan Bennink, Hoi-Kwong Lo,
and Pavel Lougovski for very helpful discussions. This
work was performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
operated by UT-Battelle for the U.S. Department of En-
ergy under Contract No. DE-AC05-00OR22725. B.Q.
acknowledges support from the laboratory directed re-
search and development program and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Sys-
tems (CEDS) program.
Appendix: Finite number of bases
The PBQC with finite bases is summarized below:
1. The verifiers agree on a random bit x ∈ {0, 1}
and two random numbers θ = θm (where m =
0, 1, . . . , N − 1), and φ. The latter is chosen as
follows. Given m (i.e., for a fixed θ = θm), an inte-
ger n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , [2N sin θm]} is chosen randomly.
Then the verifiers set φ = φm,n. The chosen values
of the two angles are, respectively,
θm =
mpi
N
, φm,n =
pin
N sin θm
(A.1)
For large N , this is a uniform distribution over the
Bloch sphere dividing its area into
K =
[
N
(
1 + 2 cot
pi
2N
)]
≈
[
4N2
pi
]
(A.2)
square pixels each of side pi
N
.
V0 prepares a qubit in the state
|ψ〉 = U(θ, φ)|x〉 (A.3)
where U(θ, φ) =
(
cos θ2 e
iφ sin θ2
−e−iφ sin θ2 cos θ2
)
. It
should be noted that for θ = 0, all choices of φ
correspond to the same basis, {|0〉, |1〉}.
82. V0 sends |ψ〉 to P , and V1 sends θ and φ to P . V0
and V1 coordinate their transmission times to make
sure that |ψ〉, θ and φ arrive at P at the same time.
3. As soon as |ψ〉, θ and φ arrive, P performs a mea-
surement in the basis {U(θ, φ)|0〉, U(θ, φ)|1〉}. If
P detects a photon successfully, he broadcasts the
measurement result x′ back to V0 and V1 immedi-
ately. Otherwise, he reports no detection.
4. If the verifiers receive x′ at a time inconsistent with
the position of P , the protocol fails and is termi-
nated.
5. Through an authenticated classical channel, V0 and
V1 compare the reported measurement results re-
ceived by them. If they receive different results,
the protocol fails and is terminated.
6. V0, V1 and P repeat the above steps many times.
They estimate the reporting rate and the QBER.
For a given reporting rate, if the QBER is below
a certain predetermined value, the location of P is
accepted as authenticated.
We assume that V0 employs a perfect single photon
source to implement the above PBQC protocol. E0 in-
tercepts |ψ〉 and immediately performs a measurement
{Π0, I−Π0}, where Π0 projects onto the state
|θE , φE〉 = cos θE
2
|0〉+ eiφE sin θE
2
|1〉 (A.4)
She then forwards the measurement outcome xE to E1.
At the same time, E1 intercepts V0’s basis information
(θ, φ) from V1 and forwards it to E0. Then the adver-
saries have three options (agreed upon from the outset):
(a) Report xE (E0 to V0 and E1 to V1), if (θ, φ) ∈ Sa.
(b) Report (xE + 1)mod2, if (θ, φ) ∈ Sb.
(c) Report no detection, if (θ, φ) ∈ Sc.
where Sa, Sb, Sc are disjoint sets forming a partition of
the set of possible pairs {θm, φm,n} (or equivalently, the
pixels on the Bloch sphere).
The reporting rate is
R1 =
#(Sa
⋃
Sb)
K
= 1− #(Sc)
K
(A.5)
The probability of error is
p(θ, φ) =


sin2 θ−θE2 + sin
2 φ−φE
2 sin θ sin θE , (θ, φ) ∈ Sa
cos2 θ+θE2 + cos
2 φ−φE
2 sin θ sin θE , (θ, φ) ∈ Sb
0 , (θ, φ) ∈ Sc
(A.6)
The average QBER in the adversaries’ attack is
Q1 =
1
R1K
∑
n,m
pm,n , pm,n ≡ p(θm, φm,n) (A.7)
In the above equations, the subscript 1 indicates that a
single photon source is applied.
Since the distribution given in (A.1) is uniform, the
adversaries’ choice of angles (θE , φE) does not affect the
performance of their strategy. They need to choose them
randomly, in order for their attack not to be detected.
However, for our calculations, we may choose θE = 0,
φE = 0, without loss of generality. In this case, the
probability of error becomes independent of φ. It is given
by
pm,n =


sin2 θm2 , (θm, φm,n) ∈ Sa
cos2 θm2 , (θm, φm,n) ∈ Sb
0 , (θm, φm,n) ∈ Sc
(A.8)
Notice that sin2 θm2 < cos
2 θm
2 for θm <
pi
2 , whereas the
opposite holds for θm >
pi
2 . Moreover, sin
2 θ
2 is mono-
tonically increasing in the interval [0, pi2 ). It follows that
the best reporting strategy of the adversaries is to re-
port all outcomes for m ≤ m0, and opposite outcomes
for m ≥ N − m0 where m0 ≤ N/2. This leads to the
optimal reporting rate
R1 =
2
K
m0∑
m=0
[1 + 2N sin θm]
≈ 2(m0 + 1)
K
+ 2 sin
m0pi
2N
sin
(m0 + 1)pi
2N
(A.9)
The minimum reporting rate is R1 =
2
K
, as expected
(found by setting m0 = 0), whereas the maximum re-
porting rate R1 = 1 is obtained by setting m0 ≈ N2 .
The corresponding QBER in this optimal strategy for
the adversaries is
Q1 =
2
R1K
m0∑
m=0
[1 + 2N sin θm] sin
2 θm
2
≈
2m0+1
4 +
2N2
pi
sin2 m0pi2N sin
2 (m0+1)pi
2N − N2pi sin (2m0+1)pi2N
m0 + 1 +
4N2
pi
sin m0pi2N sin
(m0+1)pi
2N
(A.10)
At the minimum reporting rate R1 =
2
K
, we obtain Q1 =
0, as expected. At the maximum reporting rate, R1 = 1,
we obtain Q1 ≈ 14 . As N → ∞, we recover our earlier
results in the case of continuous distribution of bases.
We obtain R1 ≈ 2 sin2 m0pi2N , which is in agreement with
eq. (3) with Θ0 =
m0pi
N
. Morever, after some algebra,
we obtain asymptotically, Q1 ≈ 14R1, in agreement with
eq. (4). Results for N = 4, 8 and N → ∞ are shown in
figure 1. The convergence to the limit of a continuous
distribution is fast – even the case N = 8 is practically
indistinguishable from the limit N →∞.
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